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INTRODUCTION
A recent wave of scholarship argues that judges sometimes fail to
comply with binding rules or precedents. Indeed, judges often ignore
“unambiguous statutory command[s]” and “apply old, overturned laws
instead of new laws.” 1 In many ways, some judges act as if they do not care
about legal changes or statutory obligations. For instance, in the past few
years, we have seen federal courts dodge congressional overrides in the
employment context; 2 seemingly monumental changes to patent injunctions
come to naught; 3 and state and lower federal courts fail to comply with
federal decisions on arbitration, class actions, and general jurisdiction. 4 In all
of these areas, judges failed to apply the law either consciously or by mistake.
1
See, e.g., M. T odd Henderson & William H. J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with Mandatory
Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. LEGAL STUD . S87, S88
(2015); Matthew T okson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 901 (2015)
(describing judicial “ overt noncompliance” as the “ widespread and persistent judicial defiance of new
doctrines”); see also Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. CHI. L.
REV. 643, 646 (2015) (discussing the common misapplication of deference standards).
2
Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory Interpretation of
Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 536–56 (2009) (describing judicial
noncompliance with employment changes).
3
T okson, supra note 1, at 940–44 (describing lower courts’ failure to comply with the Supreme
Court’s standard in eBay v. MercExchange, LLC).
4
See Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN . L. REV. 1805, 1833
(2018) (discussing a “ tug-of-war” between the Supreme Court and state courts over changes to class
action litigation).
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The stakes of this judicial noncompliance are high. Noncompliance
challenges the basic principle of judicial enforcement: that courts will
faithfully apply binding rules and statutes. 5 Under a “perfect-agent” account,
courts have perfect information and faithfully comply with legal rules,
statutes, and mandates. 6 The faithful judge promotes predictability, equal
treatment, fairness, and uniformity across the judiciary—values essential to
a functioning legal system. 7 Without a faithful judge, the system can become
volatile. Judicial errors and resulting noncompliant decisions may become
embedded in the common law, undermining statutory and enforcement
regimes and leading to distorted legal outcomes. 8 Even more generally, when
judicial noncompliance—intentionally or by mistake—occurs, “the
evolution of doctrine is being driven by something that most observers would
agree has nothing to do with the normatively correct outcomes.” 9 Judicial
mistakes and noncompliance simply lead to suboptimal decisions.
Recent literature has highlighted the prevalence of noncompliance and
suggested a variety of underlying causes, including overloaded judicial
dockets; 10 judges’ cognitive or heuristic limitations; 11 judges’ limited
knowledge of rules; 12 judicial disagreement with legal precedent; 13 and even
policy experimentation or, as some have called it, “narrowing from below.”14
Most of these scholars have derived their theories from two models of
judging. First, the “Labor Market” model posits that judges respond to the
same institutional pressures as other workers. 15 Judges have superiors
(appellate courts), customers (litigants), and dynamic incentives (e.g.,
possibility of elevation to a higher court). Under this model, noncompliance
may simply be a consequence of institutional labor arrangements, laziness,

5

Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S91.
Id.
7
See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC P LAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2
(2015) (listing legal predictability and fairness as core values of the federal judiciary).
8
Masur and Ouellette, supra note 1, at 725.
9
Id.
10
Bert Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2011) (presenting evidence of a
link between higher docket loads and increasing circuit court deference to district court decisions).
11
T okson, supra note 1, at 914.
12
Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S93.
13
Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN . L. REV.
817, 818–19 (1994).
14
Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO . L.J. 921, 924 (2016)
(arguing that although lower courts are supposed to apply Supreme Court precedent, “they often don’t.
Instead . . . lower courts often adopt narrower readings”).
15
See generally Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP . CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).
6
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and judges’ search for leisure time. 16 Second, the “Cognitive Costs” model
of judicial behavior argues that judicial noncompliance may stem from
cognitive forces like status quo bias, the power of habit, and heuristics. 17
Bounded human rationality, in short, may produce predictable “mistakes”
that shape judicial noncompliance with statutes, rules, and the common
law. 18
But unlike these two models, a subset of scholars has noted that it may
be litigants who are introducing faulty law into the process. 19 This hypothesis
of noncompliance posits that litigant briefs may contain legal errors that
judges inadvertently incorporate in their decisions—and those decisions, in
turn, may be adopted by other courts as precedent. For example, Abbe Gluck
suggested that in the context of federal court citations to outdated state cases,
“[t]hese citation choices are likely due to errors by law clerks or lawyers or
to the tendency of courts to rely on the same (sometimes outdated) set of
boilerplate precedents from case to case.” 20 Jonathan Masur and Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette wondered whether litigants’ faulty briefs might be
responsible for judicial misapplication of standards of review. 21 This
“Litigant Hypothesis” is compatible with the Labor Market and Cognitive
Costs models—all three are just related elements of a simple judicial welfare
function. But the Litigant Hypothesis emphasizes the relationship between
litigant labor and judicial compliance. The Hypothesis also applies only to
situations where it is apparent that a judge has made a mistake, rather than a
conscious decision to defy a rule or statute. 22
The Litigant Hypothesis is a powerful explanation for the prevalence of
mistaken noncompliance. Such a hypothesis calls for a rigorous test that has,
thus far, eluded scholars. 23 This isn’t to say that the links between litigant

16

See id. at 20 (describing a process in which judges will agree with a strongly opinionated judge on
their panel to increase their leisure time).
17
See Adrian Vermeule, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN I NSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL
I NTERP RETATION 3 (2006); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Moral
Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 531 (2005).
18
See T okson, supra note 1, at 922 (defining “ mistakes” as situations where lower courts continue
to apply overturned doctrine without realizing it).
19
See Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1933–34 (2011); Masur & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 666.
20
Gluck, supra note 19, at 1933–34.
21
Masur & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 666.
22
T he bulk of the Essay is devoted to these “ mistake” scenarios rather than deliberate
noncompliance.
23
T he only rigorous work has come from Todd Henderson and William Hubbard. See generally
Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1.
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behavior and noncompliance have gone entirely unnoticed. Some have
attempted to evaluate this connection, focusing on proxies for litigation
strategy and analyzing its connection to judicial decisions. 24 But these
attempts have not tested whether faulty legal rules or standards introduced
in briefs lead to noncompliant decisions.
This Essay presents a preliminary study that attempts to test the Litigant
Hypothesis. This endeavor is not simple—observing a correlation between
faulty briefs and noncompliant decisions requires a special situation. Indeed,
it would take a rule change involving an area of law where it is sufficiently
simple to measure judicial compliance, and the existence of litigant briefing
on the relevant legal issue.
Thankfully, such a scenario recently became available. On December
1, 2015, a set of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure came
into effect. 25 Specifically, for our purposes, the new version of Discovery
Rule 26 introduced two important, but discrete, textual changes to discovery:
(1) it transplanted a series of discovery-limiting factors from Rule 26(b)(2)
to 26(b)(1), providing that the scope of discovery extends only to information
“proportional” to the needs of the case, and (2) it discarded a sentence that
allowed discovery requests “reasonably calculated” to lead to relevant
information. 26 The amendments constituted a substantive change that cut in
the direction of less discovery. Because a large percentage of cases need
discovery, the rules immediately changed the civil litigation landscape. The
addition of one key word and the elimination of one phrase lend themselves
nicely to a textual analysis of decisions and briefs. In addition, almost a year
after these changes came into effect, Judge Campbell, the chair of the
committee that drafted the rules, noted in a discovery decision that “[d]espite
this clear change, many courts continue to use the phrase [‘reasonably
calculated’]. Old habits die hard.” 27 With that pithy note, the amendments set
in place straightforward textual changes, the possibility of litigation
involving those changes (with attendant briefs), and the apparent existence
of judicial noncompliance.
The simplicity and transparency of this legal setting is almost tailormade for empirical analysis. A study of noncompliant decisions and the
briefs filed in those cases would elucidate whether the Litigant Hypothesis
24

See, e.g., Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S97–100.
Supreme Court of the United States, Order of April 29, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ5C-ZZMZ]. See generally Jonah B. Gelbach &
Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of Proportionality in Discovery, 50 GA . L. REV. 1093
(2016) (discussing the “key economic aspects of beefing up the proportionality standard in discovery”).
26
FED . R. CIV. P. 26.
27
In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016).
25
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has explanatory value—Are faulty briefs correlated with judicial errors? Part
II delineates the study parameters, but the methodology is so straightforward
that it is worth briefly sketching here.
At the outset, if a discovery motion is brought after December 1, 2015,
then any decisions or briefs that apply the new “proportionality” standard
and do not mention the “reasonably calculated” language when describing
Rule 26 can be coded as “compliant.” By contrast, any orders that apply the
obsolete “reasonably calculated” language or quote the pre-proportionality
rule as good law are “noncompliant.” Then, a systematic comparison of
docket records, decisions, and briefs in both compliant and noncompliant
cases would allow us to observe if noncompliant briefs are correlated with
noncompliant decisions.
With the above approach in mind, I assembled and analyzed an original
dataset of docket records, briefs, and discovery orders in a sample of 157
published discovery decisions decided in 2016—out of a universe of around
1000 published decisions. In order to fully isolate the effects of the Litigant
Hypothesis, I tested competing variables based on the Labor Market and
Cognitive Costs models that could also account for noncompliance in the
discovery context, including: judges’ seniority, docket constraints, time
since the reforms, and differential expertise (magistrate vs. district judges).
While it would be too hasty to make sweeping conclusions on the basis of
this analysis, the Essay presents some preliminary findings.
First, the Essay finds that judges have substantially complied with the
rule—more than 93% of published discovery decisions in 2016 mentioned
the new proportionality standard. 28 Despite this degree of compliance, the
Essay also finds that in more than seventy-one decisions, representing
approximately 7% of published discovery decisions, judges used the preamendment standards as if no change had been made. In short, they ignored
governing law and applied obsolete standards. The number of noncompliant
decisions presents fertile ground to evaluate the Litigant Hypothesis.
Second, delving into 157 noncompliant and compliant decisions, the
Essay finds an important correlation between judicial compliance and
litigant brief compliance. A regression analysis confirms the statistically
significant relationship between compliant briefs and compliant decisions
and noncompliant briefs and noncompliant decisions. 29 Based on this, the
Essay argues that the Litigant Hypothesis may have explanatory value. But
the correlation is complicated and highlights important limitations in the
study. In decisions with noncompliant briefs, 89% of judges nonetheless
28
See infra Part III. T he vast majority of these decisions also ignored the defunct “ reasonably
calculated” phrase. But around 100 decisions (<10%) continued to use this outdated phrase.
29
Id.
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complied with the new standard. The fact that the vast majority of judges
complied regardless of the briefs casts doubt on the validity of the Litigant
Hypothesis. But the Essay also finds that a compliant brief is correlated with
an increase in compliance rates from 88% to 97% of decisions (or, in other
words, compliant briefs were associated with a reduction in noncompliant
decisions from 12% of cases to only 3%). This indicates that briefs may have
a limited effect because most judges are complying regardless—but
submitting a compliant brief is associated with an increase in the probability
of a compliant decision. 30 It is unclear, however, whether these findings
apply to other legal areas or are context-dependent (specific to discovery
cases).
Third, the Essay finds that discovery decisions assigned to magistrate
judges rather than district judges were more likely to be compliant. This may
indicate that, for reasons discussed below, magistrate judges had greater
awareness of the new rule and complied at higher rates.
The Essay proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the literature on judicial
noncompliance and introduces the Litigant Hypothesis. Part II discusses
recent discovery reforms and lays out the Essay’s research design. Part III
employs empirical methods to analyze a recent trend in Rule 26 decisions
that ignore new amendments to the rule. Finally, Part IV discusses the
findings and introduces future avenues of research.
I.

BACKGROUND: ACCOUNTS OF JUDICIAL NONCOM PLIANCE

This Part explores the recent scholarly accounts that have developed to
explain judicial noncompliance. Section I.A discusses the Labor Market
account of noncompliance; Section I.B discusses the Cognitive Costs account
of noncompliance; and, finally, Section I.C introduces the Litigant
Hypothesis.
A. The Labor Market Account of Noncompliance
The Labor Market account of judging posits that judges respond to the
same pressures as other workers. They are employed by institutions with,
among other things, superiors (appellate courts), customers (litigants), and
dynamic incentives (e.g., possibility of elevation to a higher court). 31 Like
other workers, judges express a preference for greater leisure time. 32 As a
result, judges are not perfect agents and instead exhibit predictable flaws in

30
31
32

Id.
See Posner, supra note 15, at 1.
Id. at 11.
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their enforcement of the law that can change substantive legal outcomes.33
The Labor Market account predicts that judges may distort legal doctrines in
order to maximize leisure. 34 For example, Epstein, Landes, and Posner argue
that leisure preferences may push a judge to limit judicial workloads by
embracing “rules in lieu of standards, deferential standards of appellate
review, plea bargaining, and, above all, the requirements of standing.” 35
These doctrines may be antithetical to traditional conceptions of judging in
the sense that the judge is not applying the doctrines because precedent
mandates them. Instead, judges overuse these doctrines to limit their
workload and enhance leisure time. The primary message of the labor market
account is that judicial decisions are predictably “flawed” because of
dynamic labor market incentives.
Evaluating this account empirically, Todd Henderson and William
Hubbard have shown that district court judges have ignored wholesale a
statutory command in the securities context. 36 Specifically, Henderson and
Hubbard found that instead of applying a specific mandate under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)—that judges make onthe-record findings that the litigants complied with Rule 11—judges ignored
the rule when lawyers did not demand compliance themselves. 37 The rate of
compliance was remarkably small—the authors observed “on-the-record
findings regarding Rule 11 compliance in less than 14 percent of all cases.”38
Many factors influenced this overt judicial noncompliance, including (1)
limited knowledge by uninformed judges who apparently were learning over
time; 39 (2) judicial inertia by judges who preferred to apply pre-PSLRA
standards; and (3) litigant behavior. 40 Henderson and Hubbard noted that
“judges must dispose of hundreds of cases per year and thus cannot devote
perfect attention to the legal details of any given case.” 41
Ultimately, the authors concluded that judges behave like any other
worker: they “learn over time, prefer leisure to labor, and respond to

33

LEE EP STEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES:
A T HEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 25 (2013).
34
Id.
35
Id. at 39.
36
See Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S100.
37
Id.
38
Id. at S90.
39
Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 J. LEGAL STUD . 281, 290 (2016) (proposing a theory
called “ judicial learning over time,” which the author describes as a process where judges misapply
sentences because they are consistently exposed to incorrect information over time).
40
Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S97.
41
Id. at S94.
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incentives created by supervisors and others in their environment.” 42 In the
context of the PSLRA, judges “do not routinely comply” with statutory
mandates. 43
B. The Cognitive Costs Account of Noncompliance
Another line of scholarship argues that cognitive forces may influence
judicial rejection of costly legal changes. 44 This model begins with the
observation that when making complex decisions, bounded human
rationality can litter the process with unseen biases. 45 These biases intensify
when judges have limited time and information, forcing them to rely on
subconscious rules of thumb. In these circumstances, judges may suffer from
the shortcomings of heuristics, anchoring bias, status quo bias, and the power
of habit, among other cognitive forces. 46 Many operate at a subconscious
level but nonetheless influence substantive outcomes.
Take, for instance, the effects of status quo bias. Matthew Tokson and
others have identified the tendency for judges to grow accustomed to
doctrines they apply on a routine basis, to the point that “doing so becomes
almost automatic over time.” 47 Once this process sets in motion, any changes
to the doctrine—small or large—are subconsciously seen as “departures.”48
The more familiar a doctrine is, the stronger the preference to retain it. In
time, other cognitive effects may come along for the ride. For example, with
justification bias, judges may convince themselves that the doctrines they are
applying are fair and justifiable. 49 As a result, judges may ignore new rules
or binding precedent.
In line with this reasoning, Tokson has argued that a slew of recent legal
changes have produced predictable and consistent judicial resistance and
reversion to overturned doctrines. 50 Indeed, Tokson makes the case that the
combination of cognitive biases, including status quo and justification
42

Id. at S87.
Id. at S89.
44
See supra note 17.
45
See Guthrie, supra note 17, at 787; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 17.
46
See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1961, 1986 (2007) (citing Guthrie, supra note 17, at 787–816) (discussing the literature on bounded
rationality in the context of procedure and explaining, among other things, that “ anchoring bias refers to
the tendency to use a known fact to anchor estimates of an unknown, and the result is that estimates tend
to be lower when the anchor is lower and higher when the anchor is higher”); Korobkin & Ulen, supra
note 17, at 1075 (discussing the factors that influence the unconscious use of heuristics and other cognitive
biases).
47
T okson, supra note 1, at 916.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
See id. at 930.
43
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biases, may result in situations where “[d]efunct doctrines, abolished and
replaced by new laws, appear to rise from their graves and walk the earth
again, influencing judges much as they did before being overturned.”51
Tokson notes that this is most likely to occur when legal changes (1) increase
costs (time, effort, and cognitive workload), (2) activate a judges’ preference
for familiar doctrines, and (3) operate under a low probability of appellate
review. 52
Bert Huang has also analyzed whether increased caseloads affected the
outcomes of courts of appeals cases. 53 Focusing specifically on a flood of
immigration cases into two circuits, Huang found that these swamped
circuits did indeed reverse district court rulings less often in unrelated civil
cases. 54 The best explanation for this outcome, Huang argued, was that in
order to manage the vast docket increase, judges were ignoring many
appeals. This finding supports the Cognitive Costs model’s prediction that
congested dockets might lead to higher cognitive strain and resulting error.
Summing up the logic, Huang cites Judge Harry Edwards, who once quipped
that “the bigger the dockets, the less time we spend on the difficult cases and
the more mistakes we make.”55
The Labor Market and Cognitive Costs accounts do not provide a
baseline for rates of noncompliance, but they do identify influential variables
and even suggest that noncompliance is commonplace. These two accounts
emphasize that judicial compliance with binding precedent is influenced by
dynamic incentives and cognitive forces.
C. The Litigant Hypothesis of Noncompliance
This Essay aims to supplement the Labor Market and Cognitive Costs
models with an account of judicial noncompliance that highlights the
possibility of flawed briefs. The fundamental premise of the Litigant
Hypothesis is that litigants’ briefs are one of the most important judicial
information inputs. Hence, to the extent briefs may contain errors of law,
they should predictably affect the quality of judicial output.
The Litigant Hypothesis is rooted in the recognition that judges have
severely limited information sources. Indeed, the asymmetry of information

51

Id. at 965.
Id. at 967.
53
Huang, supra note 10, at 1110; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE
AND REFORM 350 (1996).
54
Huang, supra note 10, at 1113.
55
Id. at 1116 (citing Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on
Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385, 403 (1984)) (emphasis
added).
52
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inputs between the judiciary and other branches is striking. In any particular
case, a federal judge is limited to information provided by the parties’ briefs,
her clerk’s research, judicial conferences, continuing legal education, and the
judge’s own reading of the case law or secondary sources. Courts have no
independent information-gathering ability akin to congressional hearings,
extensive agency fact-finding and empirical models, or support from the vast
bureaucracy that underpins executive decision-making. Even more, within
judges’ information portfolio, the most important sources are briefs, clerks,
and the judge’s own career expertise. 56 This dearth of information input has
significant consequences. Without sound information, a judge is unlikely to
arrive at a sound decision.
The Litigant Hypothesis receives support from a variety of fields. For
example, as administrative law scholars have long noted, “decisions depend
on the information that underpins them.” 57 Administrative law doctrines of
judicial deference are partly based on recognition that agencies have
specialized information and expertise that the judiciary cannot access.58
Further fields like modern organizational theory emphasize not only the
limits of expertise within organizations, but the central role that information
processing plays in “organizational decision making.” 59 This organizational
literature, in short, stresses that “decisions ensue from narrow perspectives
and distorted data.” 60 More relevant for our purposes, in the context of
procedure, Robert Bone has noted that “even if a judge is able to process
information without cognitive bias, her choice of procedure is only as good
as the information she receives,” especially from “the parties and their
lawyers.” 61
These findings support the idea that in order to evaluate faults with
judicial output—like the existence of noncompliance—we should focus on
judges’ faulty information inputs.
With the Litigant Hypothesis’s emphasis on an information-centered
model, it is easy to observe that judicial noncompliance may be an outcome
of distorted data input. The mistakes that lead to noncompliance can be
introduced into the judicial process in simple ways. Imagine a situation
56

Cf. RICHARD A. P OSNER, CARDOZO : A STUDY IN REP UTATION 148 (1990) (“ [M]ost judicial
opinions are written by the judges’ law clerks rather than by the judges themselves.”).
57
Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control,
3 J.L. ECON . & ORG. 243, 254 (1987).
58
Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2100 (1990).
59
See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Yair Sagy, Courts as Organizations: The Drive for Efficiency and
the Regulation of Class Action Settlements, 4 STAN . J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1, 20 (2016).
60
Id. (citing David J. Hickson, Decision-Making at the Top of the Organization, 13 ANN . REV. SOC.
165, 171 (1987)).
61
See Bone, supra note 46, at 1990.
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where a new statute or rule has been adopted in the past six months (giving
the judge little time to learn about the new rule). The rule clarifies an existing
doctrine that has been applied for decades. In drafting an opinion—perhaps
at the motion to dismiss stage—the judge assigns one of her clerks to put
together a first draft. In that process, the clerk may review the litigants’ briefs
and her judge’s last opinion on the matter, especially if the question
presented involves a common rule. Flawed briefs, however, may misdirect
the clerk or confuse her research. The confusion may be compounded by the
fact that legal databases do not indicate when a rule embedded in a prior
decision has changed. If the clerk copies a segment of a prior decision that
is, as a whole, good law, she may inadvertently incorporate bad law.
Moreover, the clerk may base her draft on a template or excerpts of the
parties’ briefs. The judge and co-clerks may then review the resulting draft
opinion, but it may not undergo intense scrutiny, especially on certain
questions of law. By the time of publication, the decision may include clear
errors of law.
Other scholars have noted that legal drafting errors can lead to a
noncompliant judge. Jonathan Masur and Lisa Larrimore Ouellette have
previously addressed the prevalence of judicial mistakes in various contexts,
arguing that mistakes may result because “[a] sloppy judge (or clerk) might
not read an opinion in full or might not attend to all the details and
circumstances surrounding a holding.” 62 Indeed, Masur and Larrimore
Ouellette note that “judges lack the resources to carefully consider each of
their citations,” and that the parties’ briefs may actually be the source of
many errors. 63 Similarly, Abbe Gluck has noted that in the context of federal
court citations of outdated state cases, “[t]hese citation choices are likely due
to errors by law clerks or lawyers or to the tendency of courts to rely on the
same (sometimes outdated) set of boilerplate precedents from case to case,
and we should assume that they are unintentional.” 64 These are the basic
building blocks of the Litigant Hypothesis: lawyers’ errors may lead to
judicial errors. 65
The Litigant Hypothesis is compatible with the Labor Market and
Cognitive Costs models. The core feature of the Litigant Hypothesis—that
judges rely on information from lawyers that may contain inaccuracies—
even assumes the existence of other Labor Market and Cognitive constraints.
While the Litigant Hypothesis is not a competing account of judicial
62

Masur & Ouellette, supra note 1, at 664.
Id. at 665.
64
Gluck, supra note 20, at 1933–34.
65
T he litigants’ motivations may also be important here. With certain rule changes, one side may be
motivated to misstate the law.
63
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behavior, it does emphasize a different source of errors that may influence
noncompliance. The models of noncompliance outlined above and the
Litigant Hypothesis produce a set of variables that may be predictive of or
correlated with noncompliance, including the following:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Time and Docket Constraints: Under the Cognitive Costs model,
noncompliance may result from overloaded dockets because heuristics
and cognitive errors are particularly salient when judges are overworked
and underfunded.
Learning Curve: Under the Labor Market model, we should expect
judges to take their time to “learn” about rule changes. Noncompliance
may therefore be a consequence of this learning process.
The Quality of Litigants’ Briefs: Under the Litigant Hypothesis, the
quality of the briefs may influence judicial compliance with statutory
mandates or rule changes.
Appellate Oversight: Both the Labor Market and Cognitive Costs models
emphasize the disciplinary role of appellate oversight. Judges have
reputational and employment incentives to avoid reversal.
Noncompliance may therefore result in the absence of appellate
oversight.
Judicial Characteristics: Both the Labor Market and Cognitive Costs
models also highlight the importance of other judicial characteristics like
seniority status and length of tenure. Senior judges are more likely to
seek leisure time and may comply less with recent legal changes.

With this set of working variables, it is easy to see how an empirical
test could improve our understanding of these models. In order to isolate the
effects of briefs, however, an analysis has to account for the effect of the
other four variables described above.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN: DISCOVERY AND JUDICIAL NONCOM PLIANCE
This Part outlines the research design, dataset, and methodology for
testing the Litigant Hypothesis in the discovery context. In order to evaluate
the possible correlation between faulty briefs and noncompliant decisions—
evidence for the Litigant Hypothesis—we would need a situation that
satisfies the following: (1) a rule change involving an area of law where it is
sufficiently straightforward to measure judicial compliance; and (2) litigant
briefing on the relevant legal issue. Fortunately, recent changes to discovery
rules provide a good test case.
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A. Background: Discovery Reform
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 directly addresses the substantive
scope of discovery in a civil case. For years, the definition of relevance for
discovery purposes included requests “reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” 66 In 2015, however, the Civil Rules’
Advisory Committee published amendments to Rule 26 that altered this
language. First, the amendments redefined the scope of discovery to cover
the following: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any parties’ claim or defense and proportional to
the needs of the case.” 67 In short, the alteration transplanted a proportionality
analysis that was located in a different part of the rule with the goal of
constraining the reach of discovery requests. Notably, the amendment also
deleted any mention of the “reasonably calculated” relevance language. The
Committee Notes explain the deletion:
The former provision for discovery of relevant but inadmissible informatio n
that appears “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence” is also deleted. The phrase has been used by some, incorrectly, to
define the scope of discovery. . . . The “reasonably calculated” phrase has
continued to create problems, however, and is removed by these amendments. 68

The amendments as a whole cut in the direction of less discovery. This
change became binding on federal courts per the Rules Enabling Act (REA)
on December 1, 2015. The REA prescribes that any conflicting rules “shall
be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”69
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) provides that any amendments to the rules
apply to proceedings commenced after December 1, 2015, and proceedings
then pending “insofar as just and practicable.” 70 The binding nature of the
new rules is crucial for the entire analysis.
One caveat is important in this context. I am assuming for the purposes
of this Essay that if a judge makes no finding that applying the new rule is
impractical or unjust, then she must apply it. If this assumption is correct,
then any discovery decision that applies the old rule without making such a
finding is therefore noncompliant. 71
66

FED . R. CIV. P. 26(b) (2000) (repealed 2015).
FED . R. CIV. P. 26 (emphasis added).
68
Committee Notes on 2015 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), https://www.law.cornell.edu/
rules/frcp/rule_26 [https://perma.cc/85RU-3V3H].
69
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012).
70
Supreme Court of the United States, Order of April 29, 2015, http://www.supremecourt.gov/
orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf [https://perma.cc/XJ5C-ZZMZ].
71
One possible concern is that in some of these decisions, the judge may have applied the old rules
because the cases were filed prior to December 1, 2015. That is unlikely for three reasons. First, cases
67
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With these premises in place, the discovery changes have the
ingredients necessary for a successful empirical analysis. While in many
areas of law, the existence of judicial compliance is subjective, in the Rule
26 context, it is closer to an objective standard: judges are obligated to apply
the new rule. The final element of the analysis came into place when Judge
Campbell—the chair of the Advisory Committee that drafted the rule
amendments—mentioned in a 2016 decision that judges were ignoring the
rule changes. 72
With the possible existence of this scenario in mind, I conducted
targeted searches in Westlaw for discovery decisions in the past five years.
My main goal was to look for the existence of “noncompliant” decisions in
2016. As mentioned above, testing for compliance in this context is relatively
straightforward: for post-December 1, 2015 discovery motions, any
decisions or orders that apply the new proportionality standard and do not
mention the “reasonably calculated” language when describing Rule 26 can
be coded as “compliant.” On the other hand, any orders that apply the
“reasonably calculated” language or cite the pre-proportionality rule as good
law can be coded as “noncompliant.” My initial findings using this
rudimentary coding system and searches on Westlaw were surprising.
Contrary to the most pessimistic expectations of judicial behavior, there has
been substantial compliance with the new rule language.
Figure 1 below shows a significant decline in the number of published
decisions citing the “reasonably calculated” language without any mention
of proportionality from an average of 963 a year for the past five years to
around 151 in 2016. 73

filed prior to the amendments’ effective date are considered “ pending” and should still abide by the new
rule unless the judge finds it unjust and impracticable. Supreme Court of the United States, Order
Regarding Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 29, 2015). Thus, any noncompliant
judge should have found that it would be unjust to apply the new rules to an ongoing case. Cf. Stinson v.
City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 4228 (RWS), 2016 WL 54684 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2016) (explicitly finding
that it would be unjust to apply the new rules). I confirmed that none of the noncompliant decisions
contained such a finding. Second, judges usually apply rule amendments to pending cases. Cf. Matthew
Enter., Inc. v. Chrysler Grp. LLC, No. 13-CV-04236-BLF, 2015 WL 8482256, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10,
2015) (noting that “ courts have held that it is ‘just and practicable’ to apply the new rules in all cases as
soon as they are promulgated”). Third, limiting the dataset to cases filed after December 1, 2015 still
leaves seventeen cases with the same characteristics as in the wider universe.
72
In re Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016).
73
I arrived at this number by conducting broad searches on Westlaw for any mentions of the
reasonably calculated language. I used the following search terms: adv: discovery /p “ reasonably
calculated” % propor!. My search is likely both underinclusive and overinclusive.
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FIGURE 1: PUBLISHED DECISIONS CITING PRE -AMENDMENT STANDARD BEFORE AND AFTER
THE D EC. 1, 2015 A MENDMENTS
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It is unclear whether this level of compliance is high as compared to
other areas of law. But there are reasons to suspect that compliance is
artificially inflated in this context. First, my initial searches measure only
superficial compliance with the rule—the mere mention of the new Rule 26
standard without the deleted language is sufficient to be compliant using this
methodology. This measure is likely overinclusive because it includes
decisions where judges recited the new rule but otherwise applied the
previous discovery framework. Second, these searches only account for
Westlaw-published decisions. One empirical study indicates that the vast
majority of discovery orders are released without an explanatory decision. 74
Bench orders—which are left out of this analysis—may have higher rates of
noncompliance because the judge and clerk may not have conducted
thorough legal research.

74

See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts,
and Doctrine, 85 WASH . U. L. REV. 681, 714 (2007).
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In any case, these searches left the possibility that in a large number of
decisions, courts were still applying obsolete language—a paradigmatic
example of judicial noncompliance.
B. Dataset: Compliant and Noncompliant Decisions/Briefs
In order to assemble the dataset, I first conducted targeted search terms
for 2016 published decisions that mentioned the outdated “reasonably
calculated” language and left out any mention of “proportionality” in the
context of discovery. 75 As previously mentioned, whether a case references
these three words determines compliance and noncompliance. After handcoding the results, the dataset contained over 100 noncompliant decisions.
Reviewing all of these decisions, I confirmed that the decisions failed to
acknowledge the amendments and cited the defunct standards as if no
changes had been made. Based on the docket numbers in each decision, I
then collected a dataset of Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(PACER), including a complete, text-searchable set of docket records, briefs,
and discovery orders for these cases. 76 After reviewing more than 100
decisions, motions, and sets of briefs, I eliminated those where a motion was
filed prior to December 1, 2015, where there were a high number of
discovery motions around the time the new standard came into effect, and
where the discovery language was used only in reference to the previous rule
(and not applied to the case at hand). Limiting the dataset this way left me
with a total of seventy-one noncompliant decisions and its attendant set of
briefs (usually three).
The remaining number of decisions continuing to cite outdated
language was lower than expected but still provided a solid opportunity to
analyze the Litigant Hypothesis. Again, in each of these seventy-one
decisions since December 1, 2015—when the new rule came into effect—
courts have continued to employ the now-defunct “reasonably calculated”
phrase and have failed to mention the new proportionality language. In other
words, in each of these decisions, courts applied the wrong standard and
overtly failed to comply with the Rule 26 amendments. The degree of
noncompliance varies. In some cases, courts cited the defunct language of

75

Search terms: adv: discovery /p “reasonably calculated” % propor! (1/1/2016-12/31/2016).
Docket records are directly available via Bloomberg Law, allowing targeted searches for specific
case dockets.
76
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Rule 26 in direct quotes; 77 in others, the court cited prior decisions that had
themselves cited the defunct “reasonably calculated” phrase. 78
In order to test the Litigant Hypothesis, I also assembled a set of
compliant decisions and briefs as a comparison group. Starting from a
universe of around 1000 possible compliant decisions,79 I collected a random
sample of briefs submitted in eighty-six compliant decisions where the judge
correctly applied the proportionality standards and did not use the
“reasonably calculated” language. 80
As described further below, this data-gathering process left me with 157
decisions—seventy-one noncompliant and eighty-six compliant decisions—
and the attendant briefs (over 300). I then coded these briefs by compliance:
if any set of briefs related to a motion mentioned the new rule, I coded them
as “compliant”; any set of briefs that mentioned the old rule only or no rule
at all were coded as noncompliant. I used this coding system because I was
most interested in whether the litigants alerted the judge of a rule change. As
a final step, I gathered information about the relevant judges (seniority,
magistrate/district, docket loads, etc.). 81
In sum, the analysis below is based on a dataset of (1) seventy-one
noncompliant decisions; (2) eighty-six compliant decisions; (3) the briefs
filed in all 157 cases; and (4) judge-specific data.
III. RESULTS
This Part develops and tests a series of empirical predictions based on
the dataset and working variables outlined above. I first offer overall results
before explaining each variable in turn.
A. Overall Results
Table 1 below presents the results of a series of logistic regressions that
test the effect of the following variables on judicial compliance: whether a
litigant briefed the (1) new rule or the (2) old rule; (3) magistrate vs. district
77

See, e.g., Clouser v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, LLC, No. 3:15-33, 2016 WL 4223755, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2016); Cathey v. City of Vallejo, No 2:14-cv-017494223755, 2016 WL 792783, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2016); Bird v. Mayhew, No. 1:15-cv-00298-LJO-SAB, 2016 WL 374555, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 1, 2016).
78
See, e.g., Wilson v. T A Operating, LLC, No. 4:14-cv-00771, 2016 WL 4974966, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
June 14, 2016).
79
Search terms: discovery /p proport! /p 26 (1/1/2016-12/31/2016). Although the original results are
closer to 1116, many of these decisions are unrelated to discovery or use the “reasonably calculated”
language.
80
T his collection was done through general search terms in Westlaw.
81
At least twenty-eight judges in both the compliant and noncompliant cases appeared multiple times
in the datasets.
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judges; (4) length of time between the reforms and the decision; (5) length
of time between the discovery motion and the decision; (6) docket load of
district judge; and (7) seniority of district judge. This Essay analyzes each of
these variables below, but I present the regression results first in order to
frame the entire analysis. For ease of interpretation, Table 1 presents logit
coefficients and marginal effects. 82
Table 1 indicates that two factors are correlated with judicial
compliance: (1) whether litigants briefed the new or old rule; and (2) whether
a magistrate or district judge decided the case. 83
Prior to exploring these results, a few clarifications and limitations are
in order. First, the analysis relies on lopsided samples of compliant and
noncompliant decisions. While I analyzed as many noncompliant decisions
as I could find (seventy-one), I compared them only to a sample of the
compliant universe (eighty-six out of 1000). The weighted nature of these
samples may have an effect on the standard error of the regressions. But the
odds that the statistical significance results are explained by the lopsidedness
are small. Second, in order to fully understand the magnitude of the effect, I
report summary statistics below. Finally, while I attempted to control for
other variables discussed in the literature, I cannot rule out the possibility of
unobservable confounding variables that may bias the results.
B. The Litigant Hypothesis
As discussed above, the Litigant Hypothesis assumes that judges rely
extensively on the lawyers’ briefs and are, in many ways, mere deciders
between two propositions proposed by the parties. Hence, mistakes in the
briefs should be reflected as mistakes in judicial decisions. If the Litigant
Hypothesis is right, the following predictions follow:
Prediction: Compliant briefs should be positively correlated with
compliant decisions and negatively correlated with noncompliant decisions.
Prediction: Noncompliant briefs should be positively correlated with
noncompliant decisions and negatively correlated with compliant decisions.
In other words, brief compliance should be correlated with judicial
compliance. By contrast, if the Litigant Hypothesis is wrong, then errant
briefs have little to no correlation with judicial compliance.

82

As a robustness check, I also ran the regressions on a different sample of cases.
In running the regression, I was interested in the independent effect of citing the old rule. Table 1
thus presents results under “Old Rule” for any cases that cited the old rule, even if they also cited the new
rule. But in most of these cases, the old rule is not cited to show that the discovery rules have been
updated. Rather, it is cited as good law by at least one of the briefs.
83
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T ABLE 1: LOGIT REGRESSION RESULTS, ALL VARIABLES 84

Brief New
Rule

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

1.339**
[0.339]
(0.32)

1.392**
[0.350]
(0.32)

1.462**
[0.353]
(0.33)

1.324**
[0.343]
(0.31)

1.340**
[0.339]
(0.32)

2.174*
[0.892]
(0.44)

2.556**
[0.871]
(0.48)

1.502**
[0.368]
(0.32)

-0.905**
[0.351]
(-0.20)

Brief Old
Rule

-.0806*
[0.365]
(-0.17)

1.017*
[0.424]
(0.22)

Magistrate
Judge

1.132*
[0.444]
(0.23)

0.003
[0.002]
(0.00)

Time S ince
Reforms
Time S ince
Motion
(short term)

0.004
[0.002]
(0.00)

0.001
[0.004]
(0.00)

Docket Load
of District
Judge

0.000
[0.004]
(0.00)

0.003
[0.004]
(0.00)

S eniority of
District
Judge
N

157

157

157

157

157

36 †

†

-0.006
[0.031]
(0.00)

†

42 †

157

Standard errors in brackets. M arginal effects in parentheses.
* Significant at the 5% Level.
** Significant at the 1% Level.
†
Smaller N accounts for district judges only (and not magistrate judges). See infra Section
III.C.

Another important point here is that the rule constrains the reach of
discovery. That means that one side—the side responding to a broad
discovery request—will always be incentivized to mention the new rule.
84

One limitation in the data is that I only sampled 157 decisions out of a universe of around 1071.
T his, of course, limits the validity of the conclusions. Moreover, Models 6 and 7 draw only from the
smaller sample of district judges because most decisions in this context came from magistrate judges. See
infra Section III.C.
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There is therefore no reason to believe that noncompliant parties could
merely be agreeing to litigate under the auspices of the outdated Rule 26.
In order to test the predictions of the Litigant Hypothesis, I reviewed by
hand the briefing in the 157 cases in my dataset. I focused on whether any of
the briefs—including those submitted by petitioners and respondents—
referred to the new or old rules. Specifically, I divided them into two
categories: (1) briefs that cited the new rule; and (2) briefs that did not cite
the new rule at all (consisting of briefs that either cited the old rule only or
no rule at all). 85 Table 2 summarizes these findings and details the
distribution of brief compliance within each subset.
T ABLE 2: COMP ARISON OF LITIGANT BEHAVIOR BETWEEN SETS

Compliant Decisions
Noncompliant Decisions

Briefs Cited New
Rule
67%
35%

OF D ECISIONS

86

Briefs Cited Only Old
Rule or No Rule at All
33%
65%

At first blush, “eyeballing” the percentages of litigant citation to the
rule indicates an important difference. In compliant decisions, approximately
67% of all briefs mentioned the new rule. By contrast, only around 35% of
briefs alerted noncompliant judges of a rule change. Models 1–8 in Table 1
indicate that the effect of briefs citing the new rule on compliance is
statistically significant. To simplify, the presence of a compliant brief is
associated with a 32% increase in the probability of a compliant opinion on
average. Lawyer citations to the old rule also increased the odds of
noncompliance. This supports the Litigant Hypothesis and suggests an
important correlation.
But the data tell a complex story. In a substantial number of compliant
decisions (33%), the briefs failed to mention the new rule, but the judges
nonetheless complied. Extrapolating from this sample to the universe of
1000 compliant decisions, that means at least 333 decisions were associated
with noncomplicant briefs. Adding this absolute number of noncompliant
briefs to the forty-six noncompliant briefs in the noncompliant decision
dataset produces a total of 379 noncompliant briefs out of the 1071 decisions.
Operating under certain assumptions,87 in that universe of noncompliant
85

Citing two rules is possible because briefs can cite the new proportionality rule but then define
relevance by reference to the extinct “reasonably calculated” language.
86
T hese numbers could be further broken down by, for example, cases where the parties cited no
rule at all or cases where the parties cited both rules.
87
Of course, this is based on the assumption that the distribution for the universe of compliant cases
directly mirrors the distribution for the sample of compliant cases. Since I randomly selected the cases,
there is no reason to think the sample would be systematically different than the universe. However, there
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briefs, 88% of judges nonetheless complied. 88 That judges complied despite
errant lawyering emphasizes that most judges are independently aware of the
new rule. On the other hand, the effect of the Litigant Hypothesis is still
detectable. In decisions involving compliant briefs, compliance rates
increased from 88% to 97% 89 of judges and noncompliance decreased from
12% of decisions to only 3%. These numbers lead to the following
conclusion:
Conclusion: Most judges are complying independent of the briefs, but
a compliant brief is nonetheless associated with a marked increase in
compliance (and decrease in noncompliance).
Moreover, the data highlights two other interesting results. First, there
are a few cases (twenty-five) where the briefs correctly identified the new
rule, but the judge nonetheless applied the prior standard. This suggests that
the briefs did not matter at all to these noncompliant judges. These judges
may have relied on prior orders or archived research as templates.
Second, in at least 25% of all cases, the briefs cited both the new and
old rules. This suggests substantial litigant confusion over the changes. As
mentioned above, most of the cases in this category involved briefs that cited
the new proportionality rule but then continued to define relevance by
reference to the outdated “reasonably calculated” language. I coded these
briefs as “citing the new rule” because I was ultimately concerned with
whether the litigants alerted the judge to the rule change. 90 But this confusion
between the new and old versions of the rule affected judges too. Out of the
seventy-one noncompliant decisions in my dataset, a sizable number of them
involved decisions that cited the “reasonably calculated” language as if it
were still in effect. But most judges in cases that briefed both rules ultimately
complied with the new standard.
In sum, the Litigant Hypothesis seems to have explanatory value. A
compliant brief is associated with an increase in the probability of a
compliant decision. But the analysis has important limitations. For example,
it does not account for the possibility that the judges were informed of the
new rules during a hearing. Moreover, the difference in brief quality does
not entirely explain the different results. Other factors may influence these
decisions.

is, of course, some uncertainty in this estimate that I leave out of the calculation for purposes of this
Essay.
88
T he 379 noncompliant briefs were associated with 333 compliant decisions.
89
T he 621 compliant briefs were associated with 600 compliant decisions.
90
Note that many of these briefs that cited the new rule are also included in the “ Old Rule” category
if they did, in fact, also cite the old rule.
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C. Judicial Characteristics: Magistrate vs. District Judge
The role of magistrate judges as compared to district court judges could
also be relevant in this context. These two types of judges face widely
divergent incentives. 91 First, magistrate judges are creatures of Article I
legislation. 92 Although the office has taken on many responsibilities,
supervision of discovery remains one of its core tasks. 93 Unlike district
judges, the overwhelming majority of the 573 current magistrate judges are
appointed for “8-year, renewable terms of office.” 94 Because magistrate
judges are not life-tenured, they may be more proactive than district judges
in an effort to earn reappointment or promotion.
Second, district judges can reverse or set aside magistrate judge
discovery decisions. 95 This means that magistrate judges face the possibility
of appellate review. By contrast, district judge discovery decisions generally
cannot be appealed because they are interlocutory and nondispositive. 96 To
the extent that a discovery decision is appealed after final disposition, it may
not be found to be outcome-determinative. 97 The result is that discovery
decisions are often de facto not appealable. As Tokson as well as Henderson
and Hubbard have argued, the presence of appellate oversight may induce
greater compliance with rules. 98
Finally, magistrate judges are consummate experts in discovery
proceedings. In 2015, magistrate judges dealt with over 100,000
nondispositive motions, 55,600 pretrial conferences, and over 10,000 motion

91
Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 470
(1998) (“ Because the institutional characteristics of courts at different tiers of the court system vary, the
incentives of judges at the different tiers vary as well.”).
92
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012); Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development
of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge System, 1999 FED . CTS. L. REV. 4,
III.1.
93
P ETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 49 (2014) (“In most
districts, discovery and procedural motions are referred routinely to Magistrate Judges.”).
94
Id. at 7.
95
FED . R. CIV. P. 72 (authorizing district judges to review dispositive and nondispositive matters
decided by a magistrate judge).
96
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012); see also, e.g., Nicholas v. Wyndham Int’l, Inc., 373 F.3d 537, 541 (4th
Cir. 2004) (“Discovery orders are ‘inherently interlocutory’ and typically not appealable.”).
97
8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
P ROCEDURE § 2006 (3d ed. 2010) (“A discovery order can always be reviewed on appeal from a final
judgment in the case, even though it is often difficult at that stage to show that the party has been
prejudiced by the order, or that the question is not moot, and the harmless-error doctrine, together with
the broad discretion the discovery rules vest in the trial court, will bar reversal save under very unusual
circumstances.”).
98
See T okson, supra note 1, at 951; Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S96.
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hearings. 99 While district court judges also handle discovery matters, their
dockets are more diverse and, in their view, pretrial matters and
nondispositive motions may be the least interesting or stimulating part of the
job. Therefore, we might expect greater discovery expertise from magistrate
judges or at least a much faster learning curve.
The combination of appellate oversight, exposure and expertise, and
reappointment/promotion suggests that magistrate judges should comply
with the new rule more often than district court judges.
In order to test for the differences between the two types of judges, I
coded for whether the decisions in the dataset—including compliant and
noncompliant—were decided by magistrate or district judges. After this first
step, I was left with 77% of the decisions decided by magistrates and the rest
by district judges. 100 I then analyzed what percentage of each subset
(magistrate vs. district) were compliant and noncompliant. Table 4 below
summarizes the relevant data.
T ABLE 4: COMP ARISON OF M AGISTRATE AND DISTRICT JUDGES

Magistrate Judge
District Judge

Compliant
94%
89%

Noncompliant
6%
11%

Magistrate judges complied with the discovery changes in 94% of their
decisions, while district judges complied in only 89%. Models 3 and 8 of the
regression analysis detailed in Table 1 indicate that this difference is
statistically significant controlling for which rule is cited. The
magistrate/district judge difference is important and suggests that expertise
and appellate review, among other things, are associated with an increased
rate of judicial compliance.
D. Time and Docket Constraints
Another possible account for noncompliance is that judges and their
clerks do not have the time or the resources to account for recent legal
changes, especially subtle changes to federal rules. Time and resource
constraints may introduce mistakes into the process.

99

See U.S. Magistrate Judges—Judicial Business 2015, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/us-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-2015 [https://perma.cc/Z68P-LNNB].
100
As explained in further detail in Section III.A, supra, I arrived at these numbers by extrapolating
from the sample of eighty-six compliant decisions to the universe of compliant decisions. I then added
the extrapolated number to the number of noncompliant decisions (where I looked at the universe of
decisions).
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It is by now well-known that the federal judiciary has faced difficulties
with expanding dockets. Emphasizing this point, a recent report on judicial
case management by Judge Edward A. Infante noted that judicial resources
have not “kept pace with the massive expansion of litigation” over the past
few years. 101 This may give judges less time to devote to each case, leading
to reliance on heuristics, litigant briefs, and previous cases rather than new
research.
Regardless of general time constraints, these concerns have particular
bite in the context of motion practice where disputes are resolved relatively
quickly. Judges with congested dockets may have less time to devote to
motions and may therefore get decisions wrong more often. The number of
cases in a judicial docket should therefore be correlated with the quality of
judicial services. More concretely, one possible prediction is that
noncompliant judges may have more congested dockets—and therefore less
time per case—than compliant judges.
In order to test for this possibility, I leveraged a federal database that
tracks docket congestion for all district judges (and not magistrate judges).
The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse gathers judge-specific
data on the civil and criminal dockets of Article III judges. 102 Using this
database, I specifically looked at three data points as related to the district
judges in my noncompliance sets: (1) the number of all cases pending in front
of the judge; (2) the new number of cases assigned to that judge in 2016; and
(3) the new number of cases assigned to the judge in 2016 as compared to
the average in the judge’s district. All three data points should indicate
whether the average noncompliant district judge had unusually congested
dockets. I included in Model 6 of the regression only data point (2): the new
number of cases assigned to that judge last year. Table 5 below provides
summary statistics, indicating the averages for all compliant and
noncompliant district court judges in my datasets.

101

Edward A. Infante, Judicial Case Management in the Federal Trial Courts of the United States
of America, W ORLD BANK , http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/
FederalCaseMgmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/6Q7C-PWQX].
102
T RAC REP ORTS, Civil Cases in District Court (Through September 2016), JUDGE I NFORMATION
CENTER,
http://tracfed.syr.edu/judges/interp/civjdglist.html?tracdecor=1
[https://perma.cc/5BJ5DBEN]. Magistrate judges are not Article III judges and are therefore not included here.
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T ABLE 5: M ID -2016 CASELOADS FOR COMP LIANT AND NONCOMP LIANT JUDGES

Cases Pending
New Cases (2016)
Compared to District

Compliant Judges
265
267
-4.23%

Noncompliant Judges
205
241
0.78%

Although there are noticeable disparities, they point in different
directions. The average compliant judge actually has significantly more, not
fewer, new and pending cases in their docket. But they do indeed have fewer
new cases than the average judge in their district. Model 6 in Table 1,
however, indicates that this disparity is not statistically significant. As a
whole, these docket differences likely do not account for compliance rates.
E. Knowledge Constraints: Learning Curve
A fourth possible account is oriented around judges’ learning curve. As
Henderson and Hubbard describe, under the Labor Market model, one would
expect judges to take their time to “learn” about the rules. Compliance should
steadily increase as knowledge of the Rule 26 amendments disseminates. 103
In order to test the learning account, I ran a regression (Model 4) using
the number of days since the amendments were adopted as a continuous
variable. Table 1 indicates no significant relationship. In order to analyze the
learning curve from a different angle, I also reviewed the number of
noncompliant decisions per trimester in 2016. If the learning account is right,
the number of decisions that wrongly quote the defunct language should
decrease over the year. While the number of noncompliant decisions has
indeed decreased over the year, the change is not significant. It therefore
seems unlikely that time since adoption is an important explanation in this
context.
F. Judicial Characteristics: Years on the Bench
One last possible source of disparity in compliance is judicial seniority.
Habit and status quo bias likely fortify with length of judicial tenure. As
Henderson and Hubbard note, senior status may be a good “proxy for
diminished incentive or ability to exert effort to learn” new rules and may be
positively correlated with noncompliance. 104 One limitation of testing length
of tenure here is that we can only look at the minority of judges who are not

103

Of course, this prediction only makes sense because there was a consistent distribution of all
discovery decisions throughout the year. I manually eliminated cases that had a motion pending prior to
December 1.
104
See Henderson & Hubbard, supra note 1, at S94.
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magistrates. Below is the average number of years on the bench for
compliant and noncompliant district judges.
T ABLE 6. JUDICIAL T ENURE OF DISTRICT JUDGES
Compliant Judges

Noncompliant Judges

Avg. Number of Years
on the Bench

18

17

> 5 Years

71%

89%

> 15 Years

57%

39%

The data does not seem to support a seniority explanation. Not only are
the means almost the same, Model 7 of Table 1 indicates no statistically
significant correlation. Indeed, the largest discrepancy—a much higher
percentage of compliant judges who have been on the bench for more than
fifteen years—seems to support the opposite conclusion: more experienced
judges get it right more often. Although the sample size is small because it
lacks magistrate information, the measure is essentially uncorrelated.
IV. DISCUSSION: LOW-INFORM ATION JUDGING?
As a whole, the Litigant Hypothesis and magistrate/district judge
distinction receive support from the data and highlight a possible avenue for
judicial noncompliance with statutes and rules. One important limitation of
the study is clear: the results are restricted by the fact that most judges are
complying with the new discovery standards regardless of briefs. Indeed, the
more than 93% compliance rates in published discovery decisions is
impressive compared with Henderson and Hubbard’s less than 14%
compliance rates in securities cases. 105
Although the Litigant Hypothesis receives support in the data, the
analysis suggests there may be a broader problem with faulty information
inputs. We may call this phenomenon “low-information judging” because
noncompliance results when judges have flawed information sources about
legal changes. This may explain why judges fail to comply with some rules
or statutes. Two major findings described above support this: (1) magistrate
judges—who are discovery specialists—comply at higher rates, which may
imply a connection between expertise and compliance; and (2) compliant
105

Id. at S90. T here are many likely explanations for this disparity. As an initial matter, discovery is
a gateway that all civil cases must go through before reaching summary judgment or post-discovery
settlement. That is not the case for Rule 11 findings that are merely an added gloss in any single case.
Moreover, the rule that Henderson & Hubbard discuss is not relevant to case outcomes. Again, it is just
a procedural nicety. Discovery, on the other hand, can have an outsized effect on litigation costs and
outcomes.
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briefs are positively correlated with compliant decisions. In addition, among
the only other sources of information for judges (outside of continuing legal
education or conferences) are judicial clerks. This realization has significant
consequences. Clerks may also make mistakes in their legal research,
resulting in a low-information judge.
While this model emphasizes that low-information judges are starved
of appropriate epistemic input, these features are not sufficient alone. They
compound already existing problems. The Labor Market account correctly
emphasizes the predictable “flaws” that may be introduced into judging. It
expects judges set in their ways, as well as leisure-maximizing judges who
do not conduct their own research. These different judging styles may stem
from many sources, including the judges’ own leisure preferences. Cognitive
theories, on the other hand, correctly focus on the limits of rationality that
may influence decisions, including status quo bias. This may explain why
some judges who faced briefs with the new rules nonetheless applied the old
rule.
There are various qualifications to my analysis that point to future
avenues of research. As an initial matter, the upshot of the findings is that
judges are complying at impressive rates and much more than lawyers. This
judge–lawyer disparity is puzzling. Perhaps lawyers are strategically briefing
the wrong rules or rely on boilerplate discovery motions even more than
judges do. Moreover, the Rule 26 example indicates that low-information
judging may apply with particular force in the realm of procedure. As
explained above, when judges are overworked and underfunded, the
resulting pressures on time and information compound the need for
heuristics. Such cognitive quirks apply mostly in areas of routinization, like
procedural issues. 106 Indeed, if judges are attracted to the familiar and
weighed down by habit, nothing is more routine than procedural doctrines
that apply in every case. It is precisely in these circumstances of routinization
that status quo bias is at its strongest. 107 This may mean, however, that the
Litigant Hypothesis findings presented in this study are contextdependent. 108
In this context, there may be normative reasons to be less concerned
with judicial noncompliance. Applying defunct precedent merely returns the
litigants to the pre-amendment equilibrium, which may be inferior but
nonetheless effective. In the Rule 26 amendment described above, some
106

Bone, supra note 46, at 1988–89 (explaining how cognitive bias could influence procedural
decisions).
107
See id. A possible omitted variable is ideology. I leave to a future study the possibility that the
ideology of the judge (conservative or liberal) is a relevant variable in procedural decisions.
108
I leave it to other studies to determine whether this is true or not.
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courts have failed to apply the proportionality standard, but this has meant a
mere return to the pre-December 2015 standard. Although clearly at odds
with the new rules, that standard is at least easy to apply and well-known by
litigants. In addition, if the Litigant Hypothesis is correct, then the only
parties negatively affected suffer from a self-inflicted wound. 109 It is litigants
who should improve, especially when it comes to learning about rule
changes.
Any quick fixes to the problem of judicial reliance on briefs seem
unrealistic. Possible avenues of reform, like instituting continuing judicial
education requirements or increasing the number of federal judges or clerks,
would be costly and politically unachievable. Other steps might be easier to
apply, such as imposing mandatory continuing legal education for clerks.
But there is little reason to think that mistakes can be fully stamped out of
judging. At most, we should urge judges and clerks to engage in original
research whenever possible and to cease blind reliance on a judges’ prior onpoint opinions. Another more direct avenue of reform would be to threaten
lawyers with sanctions or adverse inferences when they fail to cite new
standards. This approach was recently proposed by Magistrate Judge Peck
of the Southern District of New York, who berated attorneys in a case for
failing to adjust discovery responses to the new standards. 110 Beyond this
type of solution, however, other attempts to improve information inputs are
unlikely to gather sufficient support.
CONCLUSION
This study is not designed to provide definitive answers on the Litigant
Hypothesis; its aim has been to present an initial round of findings that
indicate that litigants’ briefs may be correlated with levels of judicial
compliance. Moreover, the study also indicates that magistrate judges seem
to be better informed about discovery changes than district judges. This
Essay’s support for the Litigant Hypothesis is a contribution to the wider
phenomenon of judicial noncompliance and points to future avenues of
research in areas with higher rates of noncompliance.

109

It is also possible that parties who do not brief the new rule waive its benefits.
T era Brostoff, Learn Rule 34 Updates or Face Consequences, Judge Peck Says, BLOOMBERG
BNA (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.bna.com/learn-rule-34-n57982085300 [https://perma.cc/B7QT3DPU].
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